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THE IMAGE OF THE HISTORY OF
OPPOSITION AGAINST KALAM AND LOGIC
REFLECTED IN MODERN LITERATURE

Abstrak:

Kata Kunci: opposition, kalam, logic, modern literature.

In marked contrast to the abundant modern literature on the history of theology, we can only find a few works, to the best of my knowledge, dealing explicitly and elaborately with the history of the opposition against Kalam and logic: (1) I. Goldziher's Die Stellung der alten Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften. Berlin 1916 ("Abh. d. kgl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.", Phil.-hist. Kl. 1915, Nr. 8, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, 1970, 357-400); (2) George Makdisi in a number of his articles; (3) G.H.A. Juynboll's Lexicon and two other articles; (4) James Pavlin's "Sunni Kalam and Theological Controversies" in History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1996), vol. 1, p. 105-118; (5) P.Sj. van Koningsveld, "Greek Manuscripts in the Early Abbasid Empire", in Bibliotheca Orientalis LV no. 3/4, Mei Augustus 1998.
The following passages will discuss how the image of the history of the opposition against *kalam* and logic was constructed by the modern writers, in chronological order.

1. Ignaz Goldziher

As one of the founders of Islamic studies in the West who was the first to be struck by the impact of the message of al-Ash’ari’s *Ibana* stating that al-Ash’ari’s theological stance was plainly Hanbalite-traditionalist,4 Ignaz Goldziher underlines the tenacious attempt of the Hanbalites to stand in the forefront against the ‘ancient sciences’ in general and logic in particular.5 Even though Goldziher maintains that the opposition against *kalam* and logic did not exclusively belong to the traditionalists, reading the whole passage of his article carefully, one gets the definite view that the Hanbalites played, in this respect, a central role in the opposition of *Kalam* and logic. This can be understood from his words stating: “As soon as someone displayed an interest in the ‘ulum al-awa’il he was regarded as suspect. The effort to track down heresy (always carried out actively in orthodox circles, particularly among the Hanbalites) found such persons even among the staunch guardians of traditional theology. The HHanbalite Isma’il b. ‘Ali b. usayn al-Azji of Baghdad (549-610), a man steeped in the religious sciences and a disciple of a HHanbalite traditionalist, was portrayed as a typical theologian tainted by Hellenistic learning and therefore a warning to others...” 6

Goldziher discussed the attitude of the Muslim scholars towards the ancient sciences. A number of scholars from a number of denominations have been listed by him as the opposants against the ancient sciences: The Mu’tazilite al-Mawardi (d.450), the Mu’tazilite Abu al-asan al-Bardha’i, the Shi’ite-Mu’tazilite asan b. Musa al-Nawbakhti, Abu al-usayn b. Faris, Kamal al-Din b. Yunus of Mawil, the Sufi Shihab al-Din ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi, ahib b. ‘Abbad, the Zaidi encyclopedist Ahmad b. Yaya b. al-Murtaa (d. 840) and the HHanbalite Ibn Najjar (d. 643).

In addition to the opposants of the ancient sciences, Goldziher also discusses the proponents from a number of denominations of the ‘ancient sciences’. A number of personalities has been enumerated by him: Al-Mursi, a contemporary of Yaqut, ‘Abd Allah b. Naqiya (d.485), Ahmad al-Nahraji, Ibn Thabit b. Sabur of Badaraya (d. 596), the Hanbalite Isma’il b. ‘Ali ibn usayn al-Azji (d.610), Qasim b. Ahmad b. Muwaffaq al-Lorqi (d.661), ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allah b. Abi Jarada (d. 540), Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-ayyib, the Shi’ite philosopher asan b. Muhammad

4 *Ibana*

5 *Kalam*

6 Heresy.
(d. 660) and 'Abd al-Salam b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, known as Rukn al-Din (d. 611).

For Goldziher, the fascination as well as the oppositional attitude towards the 'ancient sciences' is not exclusively shown by scholars of a particular denomination, such as by the Hanbalites, the Ash'arites or the Muctazilites. Different attitudes, either positive or negative, toward the 'ancient sciences' were shared by all scholars of different denominations. Al-Mursi, a contemporary of Yaqut, according to Goldziher, attempted to prove that the Koran contains references to various ancient sciences, including logic, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, etc., as well as to the various crafts and industries. The verse on which he based his argument was the following: "Nothing has been neglected in the Book" (surah 6: 38). To the contrary, al-Mawardi, a systematic thinker in the field of jurisprudence and a Mu'tazilite in Kalam pointed out explicitly that the many words of the Prophet commending the pursuit of learning should be applied only to religious disciplines and not in any way to the speculative sciences.

The same applies to logic. The traditionalist cannot claim any monopoly in opposing logic, because the recognition of other orthodoxies such as Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites that Aristotle's methods of proof was a serious threat to the validity of religious doctrines represents their attitude towards logic as well. Contrarily, the people of Kalam also cannot claim any monopoly in being fascinated with logic. Goldziher, however, asserts that the scholastic theologians (the people of Kalam) contributed substantially to the religious disparagement of logic. Mu'tazilite as well as Ash'arite circles produced numerous polemical treatises against Aristotelian philosophy in general and against logic in particular. It is the people of Kalam who regarded that logic and the natural sciences were antireligious and heretical, and those who cultivated them were unbelievers.

According to Goldziher, one of the staunchest supporters of a strict traditionalism, Ibn Hazm, came forward as an ardent defender of logic. Ibn Hazm regarded it as one of the most important ancillary sciences for kalam. He was considered by Goldziher as a scholar who assigned a special value to the study of logic. This was reflected in Ibn Hazm's words stating that all the works which Aristotle had written concerning the rules of logic were perfect and useful works. Accordingly, al-Farabi, whose chief contribution were his commentaries on Aristotle's work on logic, was considered as another scholar who defended logic. In combatting the view that Aristotle's method of proof was a threat to the validity of religious doctrines, al-Farabi wrote a work
in which he collected all these sayings of the Prophet that were useful in setting forth a more favorable judgment regarding logic, 13

Goldziher then discusses the oppositional attitude of a number of Muslim scholars towards logic:

1. Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 148/764)

As the Imam in Shi’i tradition, Ja'far al-Sadiq was considered by Goldziher as a scholar who opposed logic. This was reflected in the following statement which was attributed to him: "People will occupy themselves with logic until they even question belief in God. If you hear something of that kind, say: ‘There is no god except the unique One; there is nothing like unto Him." 14

2. Ibn al-ala al-Shahrazuri (d. 643)

According to Goldziher, Ibn al-ala was one of leading authorities in the field of Tradition, one of the disciples of Kamal al-Din b. Yunus of Mawil who prohibited him from studying logic which he considered too difficult for his disciples. In the name of religion, Goldziher maintains, Ibn ala came forward as arch-enemy of logic. That was reflected in his fatwa to a question that was directed to him concerning whether, from the point of view of religious law, it was permissible to study or teach philosophy and logic and further, whether it was permissible to employ the terminology of logic in the elaboration of religious law. In his written response (fatwa) to which the enemies of logic later on referred, it is stated: "As far as logic is concerned, it is a means of access to philosophy. Now the means of access to something bad is also bad. Preoccupation with the study and teaching of logic has not been permitted by the Law-giver, nor has it been suggested by his Companions or the generation that followed him, nor by the learned imams, the pious ancestors, nor by the leaders or pillars of the Islamic community whose example is followed. God has protected them from its danger and its filth, and has cleansed them of its uncleanness." 15

3. Taj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771)

As a renowned teacher of the Shafi’ite school, al-Subki, Goldziher maintains, took the most hostile attitude towards philosophy and even against the later proponents of Kalam who inserted philosophical theses into their theological system. However, Goldziher goes on maintaining, al-Subki softened this prohibition against logic, because of his deference to authorities like al-Ghazali whom he greatly respected. According to Goldziher, al-Subki stated that the cultivation of logic might be allowable on the condition that one first achieve mastery
of the religious sciences and that one have a reputation as a faqih or mufti among members of the school. However, for a person with a low level of knowledge in religious sciences, the study of logic must be considered as forbidden.\footnote{16}

4. The Hanbalite Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (d. 729)

Goldziher maintains that Ibn Taymiyya was a bitter enemy of philosophy. His hostility was reflected in most of his numerous writings. He also composed a special tract under the title \textit{al-Radd `ald `Aqa'id al-Falasifa} (Refutation of the Doctrines of the Philosophers), \textit{al-Radd `ala'l. Mantiq al-Yunani} (Refutation of the Logic of the Greeks) which was later on abridged by al-Suyuti.\footnote{17}

5. Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti

According to Goldziher, al-Suyuti displays his distaste for logic. In his autobiography which he abounds in self-praise, he writes: "at the beginning of my years of learning I studied some logic, but then God instilled in me a disgust for it. I heard that Ibn al-ala in his \textit{fatwa} took a position favoring the prohibition of this discipline: I have, therefore, renounced it and God has recompensed me in the science of tradition (\textit{adith}), this most noble of all sciences."\footnote{18}

6. Abu amid al-Ghazali

Goldziher discusses the attitude of al-Ghazali towards logic elaborately. Like other scholars who become perplexed when understanding the attitude of al-Ghazali toward philosophy in general and towards logic in particular, Goldziher discusses two opposing attitude of al-Ghazali towards logic at once.

In starting his discussion, Goldziher asserts that among the orthodox authorities who were not in principle opposed to the study of logic, al-Ghazali occupied a position of prominence. However, the way in which he approached this subject reflects the uneasiness which he felt vis-a-vis the representatives of traditional theology. This was reflected in the fact that, Goldziher maintains, al-Ghazali complained that religious persons felt an ingrained sense of reserve even toward such sciences as arithmetic and logic simply because they were told these disciplines belonged to fields of study cultivated by heretical philosophers, in spite of the fact that these disciplines did not in any way interfere with religious doctrine either negatively or positively.

The tenacious opposition of the people against logic, according to al-Ghazali, was simply because of their misunderstanding of the fact
that people need geometry and logic. Therefore, al-Ghazali had shown consideration for the sensitivities of his contemporaries not so much through the titles of his works as by his use of terminology, or it was through this latter that he hoped to render his methods acceptable to those persons who were skeptical of everything unusual. He believed that the traditional terms, for instance mantiq, had been used, already before Jesus and Muhammad, by certain ancient peoples who had derived them from the suf of Ibrahim and Musa.¹⁹

In *Al-Maguwil*, a work which is devoted to logic, he does not avoid the use of the term mantiq and, indeed, employs it freely in his praise and treatment of the science of logic: "Insofar as the use of mantiq involves the pursuit of knowledge whose achievement brings eternal happiness, logic is necessarily of great importance, provided, of course, we admit that all happiness is based on the perfection of the soul which can only be achieved by its purification and adornment."²⁰

In another passage, Goldziher discusses the indecisive characteristic of al-Ghazali. According to him, al-Ghazali did eventually voice his reservations regarding the purpose of logic and its consequence for faith. In his Misaq al-Naar, he expresses his weariness of this subject: "Your request brings me back to a subject that I already abandoned out of disgust and discontent. And now I return to it as one who looks back on something he has fled; such a glance is tedious indeed."²¹ Al-Ghazali, in Goldziher's words, further asserted that one who employs these sciences is easily filled with admiration for their subtleties and the certainty of their reasoning. The attitude of such a person toward philosophy may thus be favorably influenced so that he comes to believe that all the other sciences are equally as clear and convincing in their arguments as mathematics. When he learns that philosophers are unbelievers and that they reject religious law, he then concludes, because of his blind trust, that religion is not of very great significance, as those who have delved so deeply into this science do not hold the truths of religion in high regard. Indeed, many people, al-Ghazali argued, have fallen into unbelief through this very process of thought.²² In another work (*Iya*), according to Goldziher, al-Ghazali discusses "the futility and even destructiveness of the art of debate. He rejects the notion that this practice might potentially serve as a means of intellectual inspiration or the development of one's mental powers, and that the acceptance of such mental acrobatics is warranted despite the fact that it produces certain harmful consequences (vanity, boasting, etc.)." ²³ Concluding his discussion, Goldziher asserts that this fact, however, should not mean that al-Ghazali rejected the study of logic. If al-Ghazali had taken that
step he would indeed have contradicted a good portion of his own scholarly work. 24

Interestingly enough, Goldziher also puts forwards a number of facts concerning the staunch attitude of the anbalites towards the 'ancient sciences' in general and logic in particular. Asserting that the anbalites stood in the forefront against the 'ancient sciences', Goldziher maintains that the anbalites always carried out the effort to track down heresy actively. 25 They used to express their attitudes in the following remark: "If only he had refrained from cultivating the 'ulum al-awa'il! These latter cause nothing but disease and ruination in religious matters. Very few of those who have cultivated them have avoided such a fate. 26


When constructing the image of the opposition against logic, Goldziher refers to Kulini's Uul al-Kafi, Ibn Abi Usaybi'a's 'Uyun al-Anba' fi abaqat al-Aibba, al-Subki's abaqat al-Shafiyya, Ahmad Baba al-Sudani's Nayl al-Ibtihaq. Nevertheless, not a single reference was located to awn al-Maniq in particular and any other al-Suyui's works in general.

2. George Makdisi

Makdisi's discussion of the opposition against Kalam is scattered in more than four articles. 27 Getting his explicit and elaborate ideas of the opposition against kalam can only be undertaken through deep analysis. The following paragraph discusses Makdisi's conception of the opposition against Kalam as well as the personalities whom he considered as those who oppose Kalam vehemently.

Acknowledging that anti-Kalam literature abounds in the works of traditionalists, which were directed against Mu'tazilites as well as the
Ash'arites, Makdisi identifies traditionalists with a number of characters: (1) in fighting against Kalam, the traditionalist used to incorporate the dicta of the Pious Ancestors (salaf); (2) the traditionalists were careful in using terms, because they are anxious to keep a sharp distinction between the domain of traditionalism, which is legitimate and that of rationalism, which is illegitimate; (3) traditionalists used to associate a legitimate theologian with one who belongs to Abl al-adith, the partisans of tradition, who set themselves against Abl al-Kalam; (4) Traditionalism placed the rationalist foreign sciences beyond the pace of orthodoxy; and (5) Greek learning was not preserved, developed and taught in the institutions of learning which were carried out by traditionalists.

Makdisi discusses the opposition of a number of personalities against Kalam:

2.1. Muammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i

Al-Shafi’i was considered by Makdisi as the first champion of the traditionalists whose career signaled the first triumph over rationalism and whose life was imbued with a deep sense of submission to the Koran, the word of God, the adith and the deeds of the Prophet. Al-Shafi’i was also considered as a scholar who has inaugurated the anti-Kalam movement and given it its religious manifesto. This was reflected in several of al-Shafi’i's attempts to paralyze the rationalist movements, one of which was embodied in his constructing uul al-fiqh as a weapon put in the service of traditionalists and presented as an antidote to Kalam of the Mu’tazilites whom he opposed and derisively called the partisans of Kalam. His fervent criticism against Mu’tazilites, according to Makdisi, was recorded in his risala, his pioneer work on uul al-fiqh, in which he maintained that the Mu’tazilites are the great enemy of true Islam; true Islam being unconditional submission to the message of God and the emulation of His messenger, and that Kalam is not the business of Islam.

2.2. Ahmad ibn anbal

Makdisi does not discuss the role of Amad ibn anbal elaborately. His discussion only revolves around the following points: That Ibn anbal was a scholar whose career signaled the second triumph, after al-Shafi’i, over rationalism; (2) like alShafici, Ibn anbal considered the Mu’tazilites as the great enemy of true Islam; 3) As a second champion of traditionalists, Amad ibn anbal was imbued with a deep sense of submission to the Koran, the word of God, the adith and the emulation of deeds of His messenger; (4) at last, Amad ibn anbal
followed al-Shafi’i in carrying the message through to the victory over the rationalists. 42

2. 3. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali

Makdisi maintains that al-Ghazali has said:"...thus Kalam became one of those disciplines that are of community obligation to protect the hearts of laymen from the false reasoning of the heretical innovation...". But in another passage in the first book of Iya', al-Ghazali asserted that kalam is disputation among the faithful on questions that must be avoided. Al-Ghazali also avoided kalam and all that tends to favor its development, especially dialectic and disputation.43 Accordingly, al-Ghazali has never once referred to himself as an Ash’arite. In speaking against kalam he marshaled evidence of its harmful character from the dicta of the great leaders among the doctors of the law: Shafi’i above all, Malik ibn Anas, Ahmad ibn anbal, Abu anifa, Sufyan al-Thawri. Al-Ghazali also cited the second caliph ‘Umar and A mad ibn anbal as those who closed the gate of kalam and disputation in it.44 According to Makdisi, al-Ghazali had plainly listed Shafi’i himself at the head of the list of fathers of Islam who held the view of kalam’s illegitimacy.45 Nevertheless, in the same line with Goldziher, Makdisi also considers al-Ghazali as a scholar who was neither totally for Kalam, nor totally against it.46

He also lists a number of Muslim scholars considered to be opposants against kalam: Abu al-asan al-Karaji (d. 532), Abu Shama (d. 665/1267), Abu Sulaiman al-Khaabi al-Busi (d. 388), al-Sam’ani, Abu Isaq al-Shirazi, Abu amid al Isfara’ini and Ibn Qudama.


3. G. H. A. Juynboll

Objections against Kalam can also be found in Juynboll’s Sunna,47 Excursus 48 and his review of van Ess' Theologie and Gesellschaft.49 Although the whole passage is mainly concerned with a discussion of the development of the term sunna from the Jabitiyya until the third century of Islam, Juynboll's discussion of Kalam can be discerned in his description of certain historical personalities, figuring in his writing, when discussing the appellative sunna, ahl al-sunna as well as ahib (aab)
The motive of their opposition against 'ahl al-bid'a is reflected in their arguments against their opponents. The discussion about this topic will be provided in the following points:

1. The Appelative Sunna

According to Juynboll, the term sunna transformed from a particular concept into a number of significances. In the birth of Islam, the term sunna came to stand for the generally approved standard of practice introduced by the Prophet as well as the Pious Muslims of old days. When the Muslim community was under the reign of al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun and the Umayyads, the term sunna was used in disputes on legal and ritual issues to indicate any good precedent set by people of the past, including the Prophet. And under the influence of al-Shafi'i, sunna became second root of Islamic law after the Koran. Eventually, not long after that, the term sunna came to stand for the all-encompassing concept of orthodoxy, which is still in use today.

2. The Term Ahl al-Sunna

Juynboll proceeds to identify the anti-Kalam movement with the construction of the appelative ahl al-sunna. According to him, the term ahl al-sunna was already found in a well-known early statement on the origin of isnad conditions attributed to the Baran muaddith Ibn Sirin (d. 110/728), who first stimulated in Islam an indomitable tendency towards the division of the society into two categories: the ahl al-sunna and ahl al-bid'a or ahl al-bida'. Then this term was formalized at the beginning of the second half of the second/eighth century, more especially after the suspension of the mina. This was reflected in the fact that ahl al-sunna constitute the majority only after theological disputes culminating in the mina which later on paved the way for the popularity of Ibn anbal, the most notorious victim of the mina, among the Muslim community.

3. The Appelative aib (Aab) al-Sunna

The earliest definition of sahib al-sunna, according to Juynboll, was formulated by Ibn al-Mubarak (d. 181/797), a traditionist celebrated for his travelling in search of traditions, all over the eastern Islamic world. As one of the theoriticians of the ahl al-sunna, Ibn al-Mubarak is associated with the circulation of a famous sa-taftariqu tradition: "The Islamic community will be torn asunder into seventy three sects, only one of which the ahl al-jama'a, will eventually attain salvation, the seventy-two other sects ending up in Hell." Accordingly, Juynboll maintains that this definition, which is considered as a concise creed of Islam, constitutes in fact a polemic against the ahl al-bid'a.
4. The Arguments Used by Ahl al-Sunna or Aab al-Sunna against their Opponents: Qadarite, Mu'tazilite, Murji'ite, etc.

In fighting against their opponents, the adherents of sunna, Juynboll maintains, make use of a number of arguments which are considered by him crude slogans which were repeated again and again: (1) "He who says that the Koran is created is an infidel, he who says so and so is Jahmite, he who says so and so is a zindiq". 58 (2) Being engaged in theological dispute with the mutakallimin is prohibited. 59 Referring to al-Mizzi (Tufat al-Ashraf, V, no. 5987), Juynboll discusses another argument set by the adherents of the sunna as a weapon against their opponents: "On the alleged authority of 'Ikrima Ayyub reported that zindygs were once brought to Ali b. Abi alib who ordered to have them burned. When news of this reached Ibn 'Abbas, that Companion is alleged to have said: "Had I been there, I would not have issued that order, for the Prophet's prohibition to punish someone by means of a punishment solely belonging to God would have prevented me from doing so; but I would have had them killed because the Prophet once said: He who changes his religion, have him killed." 60

Reading the whole discussion exposed above, it seems apparent that the opposition against Kalam, to a certain extent, is identified by Juynboll with the emergence of the term ah! al-sunna as well as aab al-sunna. This was proved by the fact (1) that the ah! al-sunna constitute the majority in Islam only after the theological squabbles which culminate in the mina; (2) that this term was formalized at the beginning of the second half of the second/eight century, more especially after the suspension of the mihna; (3) that the definition of ah! al-sunna constitutes a polemic against the ah! al-bid'a.

A number of personalities are enumerated by Juynboll to have oppose the ah! al-bida':

4.1. Ibn Sirin (d. 110/728)

The opposition of Ibn Sirin against kalam can be seen in a number of facts (1) that he was identified by Juynboll as a traditionist who has produced the appelative ah! al-sunna. (2) That this man has yielded to Islam an indomitable tendency to divide society into categories such as ah! al-sunna and the ah! al-bid'a. 61 As defined by Ibn Mubarak in his sa-tajariq tradition, ah! al-bid'a were identified with Qadarites, Murji'ites, Shiites and Kharijites.
4.2. Ibn al-Mubarak (d. 181/797)

As a scholar who was considered as the first who defined the appellative *aib al-sunna*, through his central role in circulating the *sa-taftariqu* tradition, Ibn al-Mubarak was responsible to have constituted a polemic against the *ahl al-bid'a*.62

4.3. Amad ibn Hanbal

Juynboll considers Ahmad ibn Hanbal the most notorious victim of the *mina* instituted by al-Ma'mun, which ended in 234/848, as a symbol, at the eyes of the public, of the opposition against the *mutakallimun*.63

Then Juynboll enumerates briefly other personalities: 'Umar ibn 'Abd al'Aziz is considered by him as the first who singled out the *sunna* of the Prophet among the *sunnas* of others.64 He proceeds to consider al-Shafi'i as a scholar at whose instigation, the *sunna* became second root of Islamic law after the Koran as one who played a central role in making that *al-sunna* began to be felt as tantamount to *sunnat al-nabi*.65

Basing himself on the same arguments mentioned above, Juynboll starts to identify the opposition against *Kalam*. According to him, among a thousand names listed in *rijal* lexicons, there are probably no more than one hundred labeled *asab al-sunna*. He then enumerates personalities of the first century of Hijra, included in this category: Hasan al-Bari (d. 110/728) and Hakam b. 'Utayba of Kufa (d. 113-5/7313) and those of the second century of Hijra: Asim b. Bahdala (d. 127-8/744-5), Sulayman b. Mihran al-A'mash (d. 147/764) and Isma'il b. Abi Khalid (d. 146/763).66

In discussing this topic, Juynboll relies on a number of works: al-Lalaka'i's *Shar Uul I'tiqad Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jama'a*, Ibn Abi Ya'la's *abaqat al-anabila*, al.Mizzi's *Tufat al-Ashraf bi-Ma'rifat al-Araj*, al-Khaib al-Baghdadi's *Tarikh Baghdad*, Ibn ajar's *Tahdhib al-Tahdhib* and *Fat al-Bari*.

4. James Pavlin

Before discussing the history of opposition against *Kalam*, Pavlin first defines what is involved in matters of *Kalam*. According to him, *kalam* revolves around major theological controversies such as the nature of God and His attributes. The very topic of *Kalam* includes concepts such as God's speech which relates to the belief in the uncreatedness of the Koran, and God's will, which relates to the belief in the createdness of the world. Therefore, the term *mutakallimun* refer to those who are engaged in dispute on such matters. It can be implied that the opposition against *mutakallimun* came to refer to those who opposed
those who are engaged in any form of speculation concerning the Attributes of God. 67

Basing himself on the above-mentioned points of view, Pavlin discusses the opposition against kalam in the following classification:

1. The Companions of the Prophet

According to Pavlin, the Companions of the Prophet have maintained a belief in the clarity of the Koran based on the seventh verse of the third surah. 68 This verse states that the Koran contains clear verses of legislation, which the believers follow, and obscure or allegorical verses, which the believers accept without questioning. The verse further states that only those who have deviated in their hearts and desire controversy attempt to interpret these allegorical verses.

Pavlins maintains that when one looks at the statements of the earliest orthodox scholars, one understands that all information in the Koran and in the authentic adith referring to the Attributes of God falls under the category of obscure or allegorical verses. They rejected any allegorical interpretation of the obscure verses concerning the Attributes of God.

2. Malik ibn Anas (d.179/795)

According to Pavlin, Malik ibn Anas in his Muwaa rejected any allegorical interpretation of the obscure verses concerning the Attribute of God. It is wellreflected in his response toward the question how God rises above the Throne. He maintained, as discussed by Pavlin, that God's rising above the Throne is well known but how it occurs not understandable, and the belief in it is obligatory, while asking questions about it was innovation. 69

3. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.245/855)

As one who, besides Muammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari, stood in the forefront against the interpretation of the allegorical verses, Amad ibn anbal was considered by Pavlin as one who led the attack against the claim of the Mu'tazila that the Koran was created and not the eternal Attribute of God. 70 According to him, Ibn anbal relied on the belief that God has an eternal Attribute of Speech and that the Koran was a part of this.

4. Muammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari (d. 256/870)

According to Pavlin, in his commentary on the final book of al-Bukhari's collection, known as Kitab al-Tawid, Ibn ajar al-'Asqalani (d.852/1456) maintained that the motive of al-Bukhari in composing the
book was to reject the claims of the Mu'tazilites by collecting the authentic statements of the Prophet concerning the Attributes of God. Therefore, Pavlin asserts, referring to the Koran and authentic adith, the traditional scholars maintained the reality of God's names and Attributes without questioning how they exist in Him.

4. Muwaffaq al-Din ibn al-Qudama (d.620/1223)

Pavlin lists nine of Ibn Qudama's reasons of prohibiting *Kalam*: (1) Basing himself on the seventh verse of the third surah in the Koran, Ibn Qudama stated that God associates the followers of allegorical interpretation (*ta'wil*) with those who seek trouble and go astray. Thus, God made such interpretation unlawful; (2) If *tawil*, which is identical to *Kalam*, is allowed, the Prophet must have exhorted it. In fact, the Prophet has never been engaged in it; (3) The pious predecessors of the Muslim community regarded these Quranic verses without using allegorical interpretation (*ta'wil*) and without divesting God of his Attributes. If it is of benefit, the Companions should have spoken of it; (4) *Kalam* is tantamount to passing judgment on God in matters that the interpreter does not know; (5) *Kalam* is an innovation; (6) *Ta'wil* is mere foolishness and meddlesomeness that has no practical results; (7) *Kalam* speaks falsely of God, *mutakallimun* speak out of ignorance; (8) *Kalam* is the use of *ijtihad* concerning the unknown matters in the Koran and the Sunna, this is not allowable even if one happens to be correct; (9) *Mutakallimun* are guilty of attributing to God what he has not attributed to himself and denying Him what He has attributed to Himself.

In discussing the opposition of Muslim scholars against *Kalam*, Pavlin relies on a number of works: Ibn Taymiyya's *Ish Ulu Madhhab Ahl al-Madina*, Ibn ajar's *Fat al-Bari*, Ibn Qudama's *Tarim al-Naar* and al-Bukhari's *ai al-Bukhari*. In concluding his discussion, Pavlin asserts that the attitude and censures of Ibn Qudama, as mentioned above are a fairly-well developed summary of the traditionalist oppositions against the *Mutakallimun*.

5. P.Sj. van Koningsveld

An analysis of some aspects of the opposition of religious scholars of early Islam against *Kalam* can be found in Van Koningsveld's "Greek Manuscripts in the Early Abbasid Empire", in which the author provided an elaborate sketch of how the image of the attitude of the Muslim scholars of early Islam toward Greek philosophy was 'constructed'. This is reflected in: *First*, his discussion of how the stories found in the old sources "breathe on the one hand fascination for things Greek, and suspicion and even overt animosity, especially towards
Greek philosophy on the other. Secondly, basing himself on "legendary reports which are obviously full of historical significance", van Koningsveld analyzes the context of specific religious discussions and historical events related to the reception as well as rejection of Greek learning by Muslim circles, which lead to the emergence of what he calls the Ma'mun-Cycle and the 'Umar-Cycle. Being classified into the discussion of the 'Umar-Cycle which is associated with the destruction of Ancient Books based on religious norms, the analysis of the author of the opposition of Muslim scholars of early Islam against Kalam focuses on the question of "the acceptability of the status of Greek science and philosophy in Islamic thought" viz. to apply the principles of Greek logic in formulating the contents of the Islamic creed. Accordingly, since the epistemological structure of kalam, van Koningsveld maintains, is derived from the methods and systems of the Greek philosophy, the attitude of the pious ancestors toward kalam, as can be implied from the stories discussed, is represented in their opposition against things Greek, one of which was specifically reflected in their "suspicion and overt enmity" toward the "Books of the Infidels" (the Books of the Greeks).

Relying on al-abari, van Koningsveld discusses the attitudes of Muslim personalities towards the "Books of the Infidels" as follows:

1. Al-Awza'i (d.774)

Referring to al-abari, he discusses the opinion of al-Awza'i. According to him, the latter stated that a codex which was found in the country of the Byzantines, was allowed neither to be sold nor to be burnt. It should be buried instead. The reason of al-Awza'i to prohibit it to be sold, was because of its containing the "polytheism of the Byzantines." According to van Koningsveld, this opinion, which is considered as a rule, represents the oldest solutions adopted by Islamic jurisprudence.

2. Malik ibn Anas (d.795)

Malik ibn Anas, according to van Koningsveld, accepted the decision of a judge who commanded "ancient confused books" (kutub qadima mulabbasa) which had been exposed to him, to be destroyed. This decision was said to be in accordance with the action of 'Uthman who had burnt copies of the Koran. Referring to the famous North-African jurisconsult Muammad ibn Marzuq, Koningsveld further maintains that the worry of Malik ibn Anas of the Books of the Infidels was reflected in the tatter's associating the book with the word mulabbasa, which means confused or falsified.
3. Al-Shafi'i (d.820)

According to van Koningsveld, al-Shafi'i issued a more pragmatic opinion. This was reflected in his statement that "the books found (during the jihad) are spoils, all of them. The imam (the legal Muslim ruler) should call for someone to translate them. If it appears to be science, like medicines etcetera in which nothing rejectable is to be found, then he may sell it like the rest of the spoils. But if it is a book of polytheism, then the book should be cut to pieces, while use may then (still) be made of its (remaining) containers and its materials. These (containers and materials) may be sold. Under no circumstances may the book however be burnt or buried before it is known". 81

4. Ahmad ibn Hanbal

Standing in the same line as Pavlin, who considered Ahmad ibn Hanbal as a scholar who led the attack against the claims of the Mu'tazila that the Koran was created, van Koningsveld also considered Ahmad ibn Hanbal "in whose eyes the awful attitude of the Caliph (al-Ma'mun) towards Aristotle would have been considered blasphemous" as a scholar to whom the origin of the attack against the influence of rational science was located. 81

Conclusion

Reading the discussion of modern writers about the history of anti-Kalam exposed above, one comes to the conclusion that Goldziher, Juynboll, Pavlin and van Koningsveld shared the view of the active and leading role of the Hanbalites in opposing kalam and logic. Goldziher underlines the active role of the Hanbalites in opposing against the 'ancient sciences'. Juynboll considers Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the most notorious victim of the mini, as a symbol, at the eyes of the public, of the opposition against mutakallimun, Pavlin points out the forefront standing of the Hanbalites in rejecting the interpretation of allegorical verses by the Mu'tazilites and van Koningsveld associates the origin of the attack against the influence of rational science with Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

This idea is of course in stark contrast with that of al-Suyuti in his amn al-Maniq. According to him, al-Shafi'i was the scholar who inaugurated the anti-kalam movements. This is confirmed by Makdisi who asserted repeatedly the first championship of al-Shafi'il whose career signaled the first triumph over the rationalists and inaugurated the anti-kalam movement and had given it its religious manifesto. This was reflected in his composition of the Risalah on usul al-fiqh. The aim of
composing this *Risala* was, in Makdisi's opinion, to provide an antidote to kalam.

Compared with the data of the anti-*Kalam* movement contained in *awn al-Maniq*, the discussion of the authors about the history of anti-*Kalam* is far from being sufficient. Ignaz Goldziher, for instance, discusses only those who oppose to the 'ancient sciences' rather than those who opposed to *kalam*: the Mu'tazilite al-Mawardi (d.450), the Mu'tazilite Abu al-assn al-Bardha'i, the Shi'ite-Mu'tazilites asan b. Musa al-Nawbakhti, Abu al-usayn b. Faris, Kamal al-Din b. Yunus of Mawil, the Sufi Shihab al-Din 'Umar al-Suhrawardi, ahib b. 'Abbad, the Zaidi encyclopedist Amad b. Yaya b. al-Murtaa (d. 840) and the Hanbalite Ibn Najjar (d. 643). Then he proceeds to discuss the opposants of Logic briefly: Ja'far al-adiq, Ibn al-ala al-Shahrazuri (d.643), Taj al-Din al-Subki (d.771), Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (d. 729) and al-Suyui. Not a single personality who oppose *Kalam* occupied his concern.

Not less elaborate than Goldziher's discussion, George Makdisi's discussion only revolves around the opposition of two scholars against *kalam*: Muammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i and Amad ibn anbal and then he lists Abu al-asan al-Karaji (d. 532), Abu Shama (d. 665/1267), Abu Sulaiman al-Khaabi al-Busi (d. 388), al-Sam'ani, Abu Isaq al-Shirazi, Abu amid al-Isfara'ini and Ibn Qudama into those who oppose *Kalam*. Juynboll only discusses the objection of a few number of certain personalities to *Kalam*: Ibn Sirin and Amad ibn anbal. He then enumerates personalities of the first century of Hijra, included in this category: Hasan al-Bari (d. 110/728) and Hakam b. 'Utayba of Kufa (d. 113-5/731-3) and those of the second century of Hijra: Asim b. Bahdala (d. 127-8/744-5), Sulayman b. Mihran al-A'mash (d. 147/764) and Isma'il b. Abi Khalid (d. 146/763). Pavlin, however, also reveals the opposition of the Companions of the Prophet, Malik ibn Anas, Amad ibn anbal, Muammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari and Muwaffaq al-Din ibn Qudama against *Kalam*. At last, in the same line with the other modern scholars, van Koningsveld lists a few scholars whom he considered as the opposants of *Kalam*: Al-Awza'i (d.774), Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), al-Shafi'i and Amad ibn anbal.

**END NOTES**


2 George Makdisi, "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious History I" in *Studia Islamica* G-P. Maisonneuve-Larose Paris XVII, 1962, p. 42. According to Makdisi, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari in his al-Ibana 'an ud al-Diyana showed himself "as a pure and simple traditionalist, a true follower of the archtraditionalist Amad ibn anbal. Here, Ash'ari was too much of a traditionalist to be Ash'arite. And the work entitled *Maqalat al-Islamiyyin* further strengthened this traditionalist side of Ash'ari. On the other hand, the *Istishsan al-Khawedfi 'ilm al-Kalam* made him out to be a zealous advocate of kalam, the use of which was the distinguishing mark of the rationalist, arch-enemy of the traditionalist". Makdisi further states... "One of the founders of Islamic studies in the West, Ignaz Goldziher, was the first to be struck by the impact of the Ibana's message. From it he understood that Ash'ari's theological stance was plainly anbalite-Traditionalist. And judging this work, rightly or not, to get the final expression of Ash'ari's religious beliefs, he could not help but come to what has since appeared as a drastic conclusion; namely, that Ashcari had nothing to do with Ashoarite orthodoxy. Goldziher insisted that the credit for this orthodoxy must go not to Ash'ari, but to the Ash'arites. According to this view, the Ash'arites were not followers of Ash'ari; they merely came after him.


4 Ibidem, op. cit., p. 188.

5 Ibidem, p. 186.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem, p. 198.

8 Ibidem.

9 Ibidem, p. 199.

10 Ibidem.


12 Ibidem, p. 198.

13 Ibidem, p. 199.

14 Ibidem, p. 205.

15 Ibidem, p. 207.

16 Ibidem.

17 Ibidem.

18 Ibidem, p. 208.

...Ibidem, p. 201.
21Ibidem, p. 203.
22Ibidem, p. 194.
23Ibidem, p. 195.
24Ibidem, p. 204.
25Ibidem, p. 188.
26Ibidem, p. 189.


29Ibidem.
30Ibidem.
31Ibidem, p. 49.
32Makdisi, "Law and Traditionalism"
33Ibidem.
34Makdisi, "the Juridical Theology".
35Makdisi, "The Non-Ash'arte Shafi'ism".
36Makdisi, "the Juridical Theology" and "The Non Ash'arites".
37Makdisi, "The Juridical Theology"
38Ibidem.
39Ibidem.
40Ibidem.
41Ibidem.
42Ibidem.
43Makdisi, "the Non-Ash'arites".
46Ibidem.
49G.H.A Juynboll, "Josef van Ess's Theologie and Gesellschaft, op. cit.
50"Sunna", E12, p. 878.
51Ibidem, p. 880.
52Ibidem.
Ibidem, p. 880.

Juynboll paraphrases Ibn al-Mubarak's definition in the following passages:

At the basis of seventy-two heterodoxies (ahwa') there are four, and from these four stem the seventy-two (a). These four are the Qadariyya, the Murji'a, the Shi'a and the Khawarij (b). Whoever prefers Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and 'Ali to other Companions of the Prophet, who only speaks about the rest of the Companions in glowing terms and prays on their behalf, that person avoids, in the first instance and in the final analysis, being associated with the Shi'a (c). Whoever maintains that believing is expressed in words as well as in deeds, that it can increase as well as decrease, that person avoids in the first instance and in the final analysis, being associated with the Murji'a (d). Whoever maintains that one may perform the alat behind every pious as well as sinful person, that one may go to Holy War with every khalifa and who does not declare that one may draw one's sword against the authorities, but prays for their well-being, that person avoids, in the first instance and in the final analysis, being associated with the Khawarij (e). And he who maintains that everyone's destiny, be it good or evil, is decreed by God. Who leads astray whom He wants and Who shows right guidance whom He wants, that person avoids in the first instance and in the final analysis, being associated with the Qadariyya (f). That person (i.e. who fulfills all conditions from c to f) is a ahib sunna." See "An Excursus..." p. 321.

Ibidem, p. 880.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.

"An Excursus...", p. 319.
Ibidem, p. 322.
Ibidem.

"Sunna", op. cit., p. 879.
Ibidem, p. 880.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.

"Sunna" ibidem.

"An Excursus", op. cit., p. 320.


Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Pavlin, ibidem, p. 105-118.
The reports which are derived from Greek manuscripts which were then translated into Arabic such as ibn al-Bitriq's Pseudo-Aristotelian "the Greatest Secret" (Kitab Sīr al-Asrar), ibidem.

Ibidem.

Ibid 350.

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid. p. 360.

This work contains summary of the censures of a number of al-Suyūtī's predecessors towards kalam and logic, classification of the generations of the pious ancestors who opposed against kalam and later on against logic into nine generations and lists of a both a number of historical figures considered to be partisans of tradition who shun reason and those who were considered to be partisans of kalam and logic.

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